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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The Scientific Diversity, Scientific Uncertainty and Risk Mitigation Policy and 
Planning (RMPP) project aims to investigate the diversity and uncertainty of 
bushfire and flood science, and its contribution to risk mitigation policy and 
planning. The project investigates how policy makers, practitioners, courts, 
inquiries and the community differentiate, understand and use scientific knowledge 
in relation to bushfire and flood risk. It uses qualitative social science methods and 
case studies to analyse how diverse types of knowledge are ordered and judged as 
salient, credible and authoritative, and the pragmatic meaning this holds for 
emergency management across the PPRR spectrum. 
 
This research report is the second literature review of the RMPP project and was 
written before any of the case studies had been completed. It synthesises 
approximately 250 academic sources on bushfire and flood risk science, including 
research on hazard modelling, prescribed burning, hydrological engineering, 
development planning, meteorology, climatology and evacuation planning. The 
report also incorporates theoretical insights from the fields of risk studies and 
science and technology studies (STS), as well as indicative research regarding the 
public understandings of science, risk communication and deliberative planning. 
 
This report outlines the key scientific practices (methods and knowledge) and 
scientific uncertainties in bushfire and flood risk mitigation in Australia. Scientific 
uncertainties are those ‘known unknowns’ and ‘unknown unknowns’ that emerge 
from the development and utilisation of scientific knowledge. Risk mitigation 
involves those processes through which agencies attempt to limit the vulnerability 
of assets and values to a given hazard.  
  
The focus of this report is the uncertainties encountered and managed by risk 
mitigation professionals in regards to these two hazards, though literature 
regarding natural sciences and the scientific method more generally are also 
included where appropriate. It is important to note that while this report excludes 
professional experience and local knowledge from its consideration of uncertainties 
and knowledge, these are also very important aspects of risk mitigation which will 
be addressed in the RMPP project’s case studies.  
 
Key findings of this report include: 
• Risk and scientific knowledge are both constructed categories, indicating 
that attempts to understand any individual instance of risk or scientific 
knowledge should be understood in light of the social, political, economic, 
and ecological context in which they emerge. 
• Uncertainty is a necessary element of scientific methods, and as such risk 
mitigation practitioners and researchers alike should seek to ‘embrace 
uncertainty’ (Moore et al., 2005) as part of navigating bushfire and flood risk 
mitigation.  
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• There are common methodological uncertainties across scientific practices 
used to understand and mitigate a given hazard. For bushfire and flood risk 
mitigation, these uncertainties largely derive from the inherent biases of 
methods and their reliance on incomplete historic data to anticipate and 
mitigate rare and extremely rare hazard events within a changing climate. 
• Flood science and flood mapping are central to current flood risk mitigation 
policies and practices such as engineering works, development planning and 
evacuation planning. These require the management of key uncertainties 
relating to flood history, meteorological prediction, climate change and 
human behaviour. 
• Fire behaviour science and fire risk prediction are central to current bushfire 
risk mitigation policies and practices such as prescribed burning and 
development planning. These require the management of key uncertainties 
relating to fuel conditions, model validation, biodiversity and human 
behaviour.  
• The scientific uncertainties encountered in bushfire and flood risk mitigation 
can be categorised as historicist, instrumental and interventionist 
uncertainties:  
o i) historicist uncertainties are those uncertainties which emerge from 
the reliance of scientific knowledge on archives of historical data;  
o ii) instrumental uncertainties are those uncertainties which emerge 
from the limitations of a given apparatus, heuristic or theory;  
o iii) interventionist uncertainties are those uncertainties which emerge 
from a given mitigation intervention.  
 
This report’s categorisation of uncertainties encountered and managed by bushfire 
and flood risk mitigation professionals will facilitate the methods of this project, 
including ensuring that the research is engaged with industry practice and policy 
priorities, as well as being useful to other people and institutions more broadly: 
 
• First, the categorisation of uncertainties developed will be useful to this 
project	
  and other social science research projects engaging with the complex 
and technical practices of risk mitigation professionals. Framing these 
uncertainties categorically as well as technically will prove useful to 
analysing the management of uncertainty across and between case studies.  
• Second, it is anticipated that risk professionals will express differing 
opinions about the different uncertainties in mitigation practice in terms of 
their relative influence, changeability, volatility, and so on. Increased 
knowledge about the importance of different categories of uncertainties to 
mitigation practice will facilitate management of these uncertainties, for 
example, in terms of resourcing and design of risk mitigation training, and 
communications and education.   
• Third, this categorisation of diverse forms of scientific knowledge and their 
uncertainties supports the capacity of risk mitigation professionals to 
explain risk and justify mitigation practices both to other risk mitigation 
professionals and to the public. Being able to describe a scientific uncertainty 
	
  5 	
  
is a vital aspect of internal and external risk communication and, as such, 
these categories will prove useful in communicating the origins and 
character of an uncertainty.  
• Fourth, this report will be of particular use to non-scientists, including those 
engaged in research and industry roles, in generating an understanding of 
some of the key causes and consequences of scientific uncertainty in 
bushfire and flood risk mitigation. Such an understanding is necessary to 
any investigation of how individuals and agencies use and understand 
diverse scientific evidence and other forms of knowledge in their risk 
mitigation roles.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Scientific Diversity, Scientific Uncertainty and Risk Mitigation Policy and 
Planning (RMPP) project investigates the diversity and uncertainty of bushfire and 
flood science, and its contribution to risk mitigation policy and planning. The 
project draws on human geography, political science, legal studies and science and 
technology studies, to investigate how policy makers, practitioners, courts, inquiries 
and the community differentiate, understand and use scientific knowledge in 
relation to bushfire and flood risk. It uses qualitative social science methods and 
case studies to analyse how diverse forms of knowledge are ordered and judged as 
salient, credible and authoritative, and the pragmatic meaning this holds for 
emergency management across the prevention, preparedness, response and 
recovery (PPRR) spectrum. 
 
This RMPP project report surveys the key scientific uncertainties encountered, 
managed and utilised by practitioners and decision-makers involved in bushfire and 
flood risk mitigation practices in Australia. Other knowledge practices—
professional experience, local knowledge, and Indigenous knowledge—are also very 
important to bushfire and flood risk mitigation, though these are outside the scope 
of this report. Scientific uncertainties are those ‘known unknowns’ and ‘unknown 
unknowns’ that emerge from the development and utilisation of scientific 
knowledge. They are the things we have comparatively limited knowledge about, 
whether we know it or not, because of limits in available methods, data or models. 
As this report shows, while bushfire and flood risk mitigation involve their own 
specificities, and therefore their own specific uncertainties, they also share some 
common practices and common uncertainties. For example, there are uncertainties 
that are simply latent in all meteorological and climatological prediction methods, 
as they rely on imperfect historical data to predict the occurrence of comparatively 
rare and catastrophic weather events within a changing climate. Risk and risk 
mitigation are in turn calculated in regards to the transformations of fluid entities 
including climate, weather, flora, fauna and human populations. Above and beyond 
these considerations, there are other widespread practical issues, such as the ‘data 
and computational friction’ generated by modelling (Edwards, 2010) and the 
unavoidably fragmented work of data collection and storage. 
 
Borrowing geographer John Handmer’s (2008) tripartite analysis of flood risk, we 
can think of risks as composed of processes of risk creation, risk mitigation, and 
residual risk. Risk creation involves those processes, such as urban planning, 
through which populations, values and assets are placed in relation to a natural 
hazard. Risk mitigation involves those processes through which agencies, many of 
which are responsible for risk creation, attempt to limit vulnerability to that hazard. 
Residual risk, in this schema, is therefore the processes though which remaining 
vulnerability is distributed to, and borne by, emergency management, citizens and 
insurance companies. As such, for the purposes of this report, risk mitigation is 
defined as the steps taken by people in different levels of government to quantify 
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and minimise the probabilities and 
consequences of a given hazard. 
Further elaboration is given in the 
following sections, though it is 
important to note that this definition 
differs from broader definitions of 
risk mitigation or risk management as, 
for example, ‘the culture, processes 
and structures that are directed 
towards effective management of 
potential opportunities and adverse 
effects’, or the ‘sum of measures 
instituted by people or organisations 
in order to reduce, control and regulate risks’ (Renn, 2008b: 145). This is not to 
suggest that culture, individuals and organisations are not all highly relevant to risk 
mitigation, but that a more limited definition of mitigation itself is preferable for 
reasons of analytical clarity in this report.  
 
Risk mitigation itself is divisible in three ways, between processes aimed at 
likelihood reduction, consequence reduction or risk transference (e.g. Ellis et al., 
2004). Given that risk transference is, in light of Handmer’s analysis, a matter of 
sharing or distributing responsibility for a risk to non-state actors, risk transference 
is only marginally included in this analysis. As such, this report focuses on 
scientific practices related to likelihood reduction and consequence reduction, while 
indicative research on risk transference strategies such as community awareness, 
education, and hazard warnings is included without comprising a core of the 
report’s analysis. Approximately 250 academic sources on bushfire and flood risk 
science were drawn upon in completing this report, including research on hazard 
modelling, prescribed burning, hydrological engineering, development planning, 
meteorology, climatology and evacuation planning. The report also incorporates 
theoretical insights from the fields of risk studies and science and technology 
studies (STS), as well as indicative research regarding the public understandings of 
science, risk communication and deliberative planning. 
 
Many different scientific methods and forms of knowledge are used to inform 
practitioners and decision-makers in risk mitigation in Australia. Examining 
bushfire and flood risk mitigation in any one region, one may expect to uncover 
meteorological, climatological, ecological, cartographical, and, in the case of flood, 
hydrological and hydraulic knowledge at work. This literature review takes a 
problem-centred approach over a practice-centred approach in order to focus on the 
uncertainties particular to these hazards while, at the same time, seeking to 
produce findings that are relevant to risk mitigation generally. Therefore, the 
author has sought to identify categories of uncertainty through this review that are 
applicable across hazards. The categories of uncertainty developed in this report—
historicist, instrumental, interventionist—will form the basis for further research 
into the role of scientific knowledge and uncertainties in project case studies. The 
BOX 1 
Framing risk (adapted from Handmer, 2008): 
Risk creation: governments’ planning system locates, 
approves and makes development legal in hazard 
prone area. 
Risk mitigation: scientific studies, engineering works, 
legal standards and other measured developed and 
implemented by governments to minimise hazard 
probabilities and consequences. 
Residual risk (or risk transference): the remaining 
vulnerability to hazard probabilities and consequences 
borne by non-government actors. 
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identification of these categories of uncertainty will also provide greater clarity to 
researchers, practitioners and decision-makers seeking to identify and 
communicate scientific uncertainty to both professional and lay audiences. 
 
In the first section of the report, the author presents a framework for 
understanding scientific knowledge, risk and risk mitigation as complex 
phenomenon emerging within specific cultural contexts. While, indeed, risk is the 
product of acts of objective calculation, these calculations and the ways they are 
measured are produced and interpreted across a heterogeneous network of public 
and private individuals. The second section examines uncertainties that are 
universal across the diverse scientific practices used in bushfire and flood risk 
mitigation. The third section surveys uncertainties that are particular to these 
specific hazards and examines their expression in two case study areas—the 
Hawkesbury-Nepean Valley in New South Wales and the Barwon-Otway area of 
Victoria—to show how these uncertainties might be of greater or lesser concern in a 
given circumstance. This report then closes with a brief conclusion rearticulating 
the categorisation of scientific uncertainties in bushfire and flood risk mitigation 
practices as historicist, instrumental or interventionist. 
 
This report will be of particular use to non-scientists, including those engaged in 
research and industry roles, in generating an understanding of some of the key 
causes and consequences of scientific uncertainty in bushfire and flood risk 
mitigation. Such an understanding is a necessary to any investigation of how 
individuals and agencies use and understand diverse scientific evidence and other 
forms of knowledge in their risk mitigation roles. As it is a necessary element of 
scientific methods, and as such risk mitigation practitioners and researchers alike 
should seek to ‘embrace uncertainty’ (Moore et al., 2005). 
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1: RISK, RISK MITIGATION, AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 
 
In Australia, risk is often defined in industry standards as ‘probability x 
consequences,’ or the probability of a given event and its consequences in relation 
to assets and values (Standards Australia, 2009b). While this definition has 
significant functional utility, it does not make explicit the situated and contingent 
character of probabilities and consequences, factors which can not only have a 
determining influence on policy and planning. As sociologist Peter Glasner argues 
(2000: 134), ‘any discussion of risk is as much about culture, institutions, 
perceptions, control and activity as it is about how risks are framed by experts’. As 
such, the sociological literature on risk that has flourished since Douglas and 
Wildavsky’s Risk and Culture (1982) has tended to speak of ‘risk culture’ or ‘risk 
society’. A risk society, as described in the work of sociologists such as Ulrich Beck 
and Anthony Giddens, is a social formation in which vulnerability to, and 
responsibility for, natural hazards are the object of calculation and calculated 
distribution across populations. Reviewing this scholarship, Scott Lash (2000) 
summarises its achievements as having uncovered the ways in which we are all 
articulated in relation to, on the one hand, uncertainties and vulnerabilities and, on 
the other, practices of figuring uncertainties and vulnerabilities that are neither 
simply chosen nor are they naturally allocated. As Beck argues (1992: 23), news 
media, scientific experts, governments, courts, insurance agencies are all important 
actors shaping and shaped by dominant definitions of what is and is not a risk, 
what causes a risk, who is liable for a risk, and so on. Lay publics can—and 
sometimes do—drive the creation, mitigation and distribution of risk. 
 
To return to Handmer’s tripartite analysis, risk mitigation is the name for the many 
practices through which a hazard and its associated uncertainties are calculated, 
managed and controlled. It is an intermediary stage between the creation and 
privatisation of risk—between its formation and the distribution of responsibility to 
non-state parties—involving decisions about at-risk values and assets and the 
political, environmental and economic consequences of interventions. In the context 
of bushfire and flood risk in Australia, mitigation occurs through efforts to predict 
where and how bushfire and flood events might occur, limiting the likelihood of 
bushfires and flood events where possible, and minimising the consequences of 
unavoidable events. The various measures brought to bear are often interrelated as, 
for instance, a predictive tool such as a flood study is also routinely a crucial 
component of planning overlays which seek to minimise hazard effects. This brings 
us to another key point about risk, which is that it is not only addressed in a 
number of contexts by a number of different private and public agencies, but that it 
is also captured in specific calculations and calculating devices. Several practical 
examples are given below to illustrate how scientific knowledge in risk mitigation 
emerges from material networks. 
 
Like risk, scientific knowledge is shaped—but not determined—by the context in 
which they emerge. This insight is at the centre of science and technology studies 
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(STS) and the sociology of scientific knowledge, both of which emphasise the 
importance of examining how knowledge develops from specific technical 
apparatuses, archives and institutions (see Bijker et al., 1987; Hackett et al., 2008). 
Scientific knowledge is in this sense, as sociologist David Turnbull argues, a ‘local 
knowledge practice’ employed by specific individuals labouring in collaboration 
with specific apparatuses in specific institutional locations. To use the language of 
STS, we come to know a hazard in a given place through an assemblage of agents, 
including measuring devices (anemometers, thermometers, hygrometers, fuel 
estimation scales), archives of historical data (rainfall and burn history) and 
standardised algorithms for synthesising the two. Risk mitigation is, on this 
account, reliant on the creation of synthetic facts, or what sociologist Bruno Latour 
calls ‘combinable mobiles’ (1987: 227), that are comprehensible, translatable and 
available to new syntheses in other locations. Fire danger measures such as 
McArthur Forest Fire Danger Index (FFDI), the Canadian Forest Fire Weather Index 
System, and the United States National Fire Danger Ratings System are examples of 
such mobiles, devised to represent the many measures of bushfire risk in a single 
quantum. 
 
This report begins by foregrounding the scholarship of risk studies and STS 
because it makes clear the conventionalised and contingent character of scientific 
knowledge and risk mitigation. That is, it makes clear that the devices, archives, 
algorithms and quanta used to scientifically articulate and understand risk are not 
incidental. While the use of each may be determined as much by institutional ‘lock-
in’ as by its scientific merit, these objects may also be replaced and refined. Each is 
an ‘epistemic object,’ at the same time both functioning ‘things-to-be-used’ and 
fluid ‘things-in-a-process-of-transformation’ (Knorr-Cetina, 2001; see also Sundberg, 
2009: 165-177). In addition, this literature illustrates the necessity of attending to 
how objectified knowledge is shaped by, and responds to, the contingencies of what 
may be known and achieved in that place and, simultaneously, what those involved 
contend may be known and achieved in that place. In some instances, a hazard may 
only be perceived ‘downstream’, long after its initial occurrence. In other instances, 
a form of risk mitigation based on available calculations may be mistaken for a 
surety, leading to drastic increases in the number of assets that are put at risk 
(Burby, 2006; also Smith, 1998: 232-233; Stevens et al., 2010). Thus, in thinking 
about risk mitigation we should not lose sight of the ‘permeable, changeable, and 
contestable’ boundaries between scientific research, scientific knowledge and the 
political, economic and social context (van Kerkhoff and Lebel, 2006: 454). Risk 
mitigation occurs at a complex interface where reception and utilization is a matter 
of ‘who is engaged and which interests are represented’ (Petts, 2008; Wynne, 1992). 
Just as uncertainty can elicit necessary caution, new lines of inquiry and new 
collaborations, it can equally be exploited for partisan gain. 
 
This brief introduction to the social science fields of risk studies and STS suggests 
that understanding the forms of scientific knowledge and scientific uncertainties 
encountered in risk mitigation requires more than insights into the technical 
parameters of scientific manuals. Risk is socially constructed and socially 
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distributed, and thus it is necessary to acquire both a broad view of knowledge and 
uncertainties and to examine their articulation in a given context or case. The 
following sections are devoted to these two tasks. 
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2: METHODOLOGICAL UNCERTAINTIES 
It is important to be clear that all scientific practices are necessarily probabilistic 
and, therefore, absolute universal reliability is a false standard against which to 
judge scientific knowledge (see Latour, 1999; Popper, 2014). The nature of scientific 
inquiry is to produce knowledge or facts verified by their reproducibility, a task 
that also involves attempts to falsify existing theories and to perfect the data and 
theories on which these verified and reproducible facts are based. However, while 
datasets can be expanded, measurements can be made more accurate, algorithms 
can be adjusted and practices can be synthesised to produce complex 
understandings of natural systems, scientific practices cannot eliminate the 
existence of uncertainty—they can only seek to identify, minimise and quantify 
specific uncertainties. For example, while meteorological modelling and prediction 
have progressed massively thanks to 
the development of Numerical 
Weather Prediction (NWP) and ‘Monte 
Carlo’ ensemble prediction 
techniques—where the probabilities 
of variations around a central ‘control’ 
forecast are tested through multiple 
simulations (e.g. Cloke and 
Pappenberger, 2009: 615)—there is a 
degree of residual uncertainty that is 
simply endemic to the task of 
anticipating non-linear dynamical 
systems such as weather (see 
Handmer and Dovers, 2007: 26). As 
Collins and Evans have argued, if we 
hope to understand scientific fields, 
we must pay attention to the extent to 
which their major debates and 
uncertainties are capable of closure 
(Collins and Evans, 2002). Whereas some fields contain no major disputes (‘normal 
science’) or the potential for closure (‘golem science’), others have many disputes 
and present little prospect for closure (see Box 1).1 
 
In addition, it is important to understand that the probabilities generated to predict 
and mitigate natural hazards are, to a significant degree, reliant on historical data. 
They are, in this sense, historicist in that their use implies a determining relation 
between the past, the present and the future (Hulme, 2010). In predicting and 
mitigating floods, Lane et al. write (2011: 1784), ‘the futures imagined are tied to 	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
1 Sociologists of science have paid significant attention to Collins and Evans’s provocative and normative terms. For 
example, see: Rip A. (2003) Constructing Expertise: in a third wave of Science Studies? Social Studies of Science: 419-
434, Wynne B. (2003) Seasick on the third wave? Subverting the hegemony of propositionalism: Response to Collins 
& Evans (2002). Social Studies of Science 33: 401-417. 
BOX 2 
 Typology of scientific fields (Collins and Evans, 2002): 
• Normal science: fields in which there are no 
major disputes; methods and theories 
procedures are as routinised and settled as 
possible. 
• Golem science: fields which have the potential 
become ‘normal’ but are not yet; debates 
continue not only within the field but also 
involve politicians and publics. 
• Historical science: fields which do not have 
significant potential to become ‘normal’, largely 
because they deal with unique historical trends 
(e.g. climate) rather than repeatable 
phenomena. 
• Reflexive historical science: as above, those 
these are fields in which human actions and 
debates shape the object under study (e.g. 
climate change). 
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pasts experienced’. This historical data comes in a wide variety of forms—rainfall 
volumes, stream heights, stream flow velocity, topography, floor heights etc.—and 
is universally subject to two types of limitation: 
• Measuring: The first type are limitations owed to the technological and 
political history of measurement, including gaps in available data due to 
innovations in measuring apparatuses, variations in data metrics, and 
variations in the geographical spread of measuring apparatuses. For instance, 
the coverage of rain and stream gauges across catchments in Australia is 
highly inconsistent due to historic funding shortfalls and debates between 
jurisdictions over their respective responsibilities (Wenger et al., 2013). 
Alternately, there is historic variation in wind speed metrics, meaning 
archives and practice are not only limited by unreliable measurements but 
also by the inhomogeneity of units of measurement and, thereby, data 
homogenisation processes (HEPEX, 2014; Lucas, 2010). In other instances, 
data are commercially sensitive or their collection and storage is fragmented 
across parties, creating further ‘holes’ in the datasets available to private and 
public agencies predicting and mitigating natural hazards.  
• Climate change: the second type of limitation in historical data is 
attributable to the effect of climate change on the widespread presumption 
that natural systems fluctuate within an unchanging envelope of variability 
known as ‘stationarity’. As Westra et al. (2010) have argued, ‘the validity of 
the historical record… becomes increasingly questionable in directly 
evaluating flood risk in the light of anthropocentric climate change’. Climate 
change puts in question both the parameters of this envelope and our ability 
to know this envelope, meaning that, as climate scientists suggest, 
‘stationarity is dead’ (Milly et al., 2008). Climate change projections of 
environmental variables could, in turn, be understood as a form of ‘historical 
data’ with a dynamic relationship to the past. In this regard, it is important 
to note that the extent to which climate change is relevant to a given hazard 
and its mitigation varies widely depending on the temporal parameters of an 
analysis. That is, the relevance of climate change to understandings of a 
hazard in a particular area is a product of the anticipated changes and the 
timespan over which they will occur (see Merz et al., 2010; Lins and Cohn, 
2011; Galloway, 2011). 
 
Our ability to predict both the timing and effect of both hazard events and 
mitigation interventions are also limited by practical considerations relating to 
technology, reporting, and resourcing. While uncertainties introduced through the 
use of historical data are significant in bushfire and flood risk mitigation, there is 
perhaps no greater source of uncertainty than the practical business of data 
collection and analysis in the present. Several specific examples will be given in the 
following sections, though some illustrative examples are, for instance, the common 
use of point-based data to measure dynamic and extremely localised phenomena 
such as rainfall or the use of data on the presence of particular species as a 
measure of gross biodiversity. In each case, a combination of measures acts an 
index for a presence we know exists but cannot yet measure directly. These same 
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issues also reoccur in attempts to plan and understand interventions to reduce 
consequences and likelihoods, as any intervention produces their own ‘explosions 
of uncertainty’ (Dessai et al., 2009) regarding their actual environmental effects and 
how these effects will be legible. Further, these practitioners must manage what 
historian Paul Edwards (2010: 83-110) calls the ‘data and computational friction’ 
generated by modelling. In practice, any synthesis of data to calculate probabilities 
and generate scenarios strains against the limitations of available computational 
resources and reporting requirements. Thus, uncertainties may be introduced to the 
practical work of risk mitigation to manage computational drag. Measuring 
apparatuses and resources are finite and we come to ‘know’ the behaviour of a 
system within institutional bounds whose finitude may not be obvious. 
 
The final category of general methodological uncertainties are those introduced 
through the use of standards whose applicability and accuracy are contested. These 
uncertainties are related to those originating in resource limitations, though they 
are due less to practical concerns than they are ‘cultural’ factors such as path 
dependency (see Wilson, 2012; Berkhout, 2002). Bushfire and flood risk mitigation 
both offer primary examples of these contested standards. For example: 
• Flood risk: Most jurisdictions in Australia use the 1% Annual Exceedence 
Probability (1%AEP) level as the general standard in flood modelling, mapping 
and development planning (Comrie, 2011: 193). This standard has different 
names—ARI (Average Recurrence Interval), ‘one-hundred year flood’, Q100—
but, as Wenger et al. explain, it is always ‘a statistical estimate of the average 
period in years between the occurrence of a flood of a given size’; a 100ARI, 
Q100 or 1%AEP flood event are both events that have a predicted 1:100 
likelihood of occurring in any given year. Of course, to speak of averages and 
probabilities is to invoke the historical data sets from which they are drawn 
and, thereby, the contention that the given system is sufficiently stationary 
as to be averaged. The adoption of this standard has been criticised for being 
insufficiently cautious and ‘a very coarse tool’ for judging flood risk (Wisner 
et al., 2004: 201-242), since the difference between a predicted 1%AEP and 
Probable Maximum Flood (PMF)—the theoretically largest flood resulting 
from a combination of the most severe meteorological and hydrologic 
conditions that could conceivably occur—may be considerable (Smith et al., 
1996: 51; Bewsher and Maddocks, 2003). At the same time, 1%AEP 
predictions are often misinterpreted as corresponding to a flood event that 
should occur solely every hundred years rather than every hundred years on 
average over time (see McKay, 1984; Kidson and Richards, 2005; Bell and 
Tobin, 2007). 
• Bushfire risk: the dominant standard measure of bushfire risk in Australia is 
McArthur FFDI. Developed in the 1960s by CSIRO scientist A.G. McArthur and 
others (see Pyne, 1991: 338-361), FFDI combines temperature, relative 
humidity, wind speed and an estimate of fuel conditions to produce a 
number predicting the intensity of a hypothetical fire (Lucas, 2010). Like 
1%AEP, FFDI is a tool of translation based upon historical data, and McArthur 
used condition records for 13 January 1939 or ‘Black Friday’ in Victoria to 
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represent the maximum of 100 FFDI (Adams and Attiwill, 2011: 28). While 
many consider its simplicity and translatability to be real benefits (San-
Miguel-Ayanz et al., 2003), others have drawn attention to its unproven 
assumptions, its insensitivity to ecological variation, its high sensitivity to 
changes in wind speed, and its inability to incorporate several significant 
environmental factors that influence fire behaviour such as fuel type and 
topography (Dowdy et al., 2009). Like 1%AEP, this scientific standard is an 
answer to the question of required model complexity (see Apel et al., 2009). 
The fact that FFDI is not simply central to risk mitigation activities, such as 
total fire bans, but also how the public understand fire risk and the dangers 
of climate change (e.g. Hughes and Steffen, 2013), indicates that it is 
sufficiently accurate for many. We should nonetheless be mindful of the fact 
that operational utility may inadvertently mask the uncertainties and 
suppositions underpinning it.  
 
All scientific knowledge in risk mitigation is conditioned by its probabilistic and 
historicist methods. It is ‘limited’ by these factors in the sense that they represent 
the specific character, and therefore specific strengths, of expert disciplines such as 
meteorology, climatology, hydrology, fire ecology, hydraulic engineering, and so on. 
At the same time, these practices are—in pure research and applied contexts alike—
conditioned by practical limitations of available technology, reporting requirements, 
and present and past resourcing. They also function within the parameters of 
contested but institutionalised standard measures, formula and processes. In sum, 
we might say that scientific knowledge within risk mitigation takes the form of 
cycles of abductive reasoning—cycles in which logical inferences from available 
data and available knowledge are made to produce functioning hypotheses in light 
of known uncertainties, only to be revised as data, knowledge and knowledge about 
uncertainties continue to change (Thagard and Shelley, 1997). As such, known 
unknowns are a necessary and necessarily changeable part of bushfire and flood 
risk mitigation practice. 
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3: KNOWING THE HAZARD: FLOOD AND BUSHFIRE 
3.1: FLOOD 
In Australia, floods cost on average $377 million annually, making them the 
nation’s most expensive natural hazard (Wenger et al., 2013: 65). Major floods in 
southeastern and northern Australia over the past decade have demonstrated this 
fact, most recently through the December 2010-January 2011 floods in southeast 
Queensland, which were responsible for 38 fatalities, approximately $2.38 billion in 
damages, and an estimated $30 billion in lost revenue. Also in January 2011, 
western and central Victoria experienced ‘one of the worst flood events in its 
history’, in the words of one forecaster, leading to 2 fatalities and approximately $2 
billion in damages (Turnbull, 2011). Four years earlier, in June 2007, flooding in the 
Hunter and Central Coast regions of New South Wales led to 10 fatalities and 
insured losses of $1.17 billion, while two years before this, in June 2005, flooding in 
northeast New South Wales and southeast Queensland led to another 3 fatalities. 
North Australia is also subject to flooding, and in 1998 Katherine and Daly River 
were inundated during Tropical Cyclone Les, leading to 3 deaths, 30 casualties and 
an estimated $200 million in damages. This is only a partial list of the floods in the 
past two decades that have caused loss of life in Australia, and does not include the 
many floods which have caused significant damage to property and infrastructure. 
Thus, given the frequency and disastrous effects of these events it is 
understandable that a significant amount of effort has been put towards 
understanding floods, quantifying the risks they pose and mitigating those risks.  
 
Floods come in many varieties, including river (fluvial) floods, flash floods, urban 
floods, pluvial floods, sewer floods, coastal floods and glacial lake outburst floods. 
This report focuses on river flooding, the dominant hazard in Australia, which 
occurs where a main river channel is unable to carry the amount of water being 
supplied to it over a short period of time from precipitation. Such floods are 
therefore a function of precipitation (rainfall and runoff), channel geometry and 
floodplain topography, meaning that scientific inquiry into flood behaviour and 
flood mitigation are largely devoted to measuring and managing one or more of 
these three dimensions.   
 
In Australia, the task of understanding floods is fundamentally conditioned by the 
fact that the continent has the most variable river flow patterns in the world, in part 
due to the influence of the El Niño Southern Oscillation and its ability to produce 
both extreme aridity and extreme rainfall in the same site (White, 2000); the world’s 
driest inhabited continent also has the greatest annual rainfall and runoff 
variability. More generally, as Schaake et al. state (2007), there are ‘tremendous 
uncertainties’ that must be managed in assessing flood occurrence and behaviour 
and in mitigating flood risk anywhere. Predictions of flood occurrence, for example, 
involve a combination of methods whose relative accuracy is uncertain, including 
written accounts, gauge readings and paleoflood hydrology, which, in turn, involves 
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radiocarbon or optically stimulated luminescence dating of sediments to estimate 
flood history over the past 100-10,000 years (Benito et al., 2004). Rather than avoid 
these uncertainties, some have called upon flood scientists and practitioners to 
‘embrace uncertainty’ in flood science, adopting a risk-based understanding of 
flood science practices (Moore et al., 2005). This amounts to being clear about the 
extent to which understanding floods involves the use of strategic practices based 
on strategic knowledge; what can be done in the present situation based on what 
can be known with the present tools. As the determining effects of a given context 
mean the ‘embrace’ of uncertainties will be dependent of local political, economic 
and environmental factors, this paper will later assess a specific flood risk 
landscape. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to first summarise some widespread issues 
in understanding this hazard and its mitigation. 
 
A primary obstacle to understanding floods scientifically is the rarity of major 
floods within any given region, despite their seeming ubiquity across countries such 
as Australia. This leads to a broad set of issues related to how we might not only 
predict, for example, what height a 1%AEP flood might reach but also how such an 
extreme flood might behave. As Cloke and Pappenberger state (2009: 616), several 
uncertainties follow from the inherent rarity of floods:  
• Validating forecasts: first, any attempt to evaluate meteorological forecasts 
for hydrological applications, and thus to validate flood forecasts, is 
fundamentally limited by the low frequency of extreme floods. It is difficult 
to test the correspondence between a rare phenomenon and its projection in 
a given floodplain without recent historical exemplars.  
• Many influences: second, land use, soil character (permeability, soil moisture 
content and its vertical distribution), ground water, channel and riverbed 
characteristics, riverine vegetation and river management in floodplains all 
influence flood behaviour. But because none of these aspects are static over 
time, any comparison between the present and a historic flood event is 
potentially tenuous. Dams, roads, land clearance, erosion, pre-burst rainfall, 
and many other factors influence how floodwaters travel beyond the 
riverbank (see also Wenger et al., 2013: 44). Equally, whether a flood occurs 
in winter or summer, or after bushfire or landslip, can have a significant 
effect on its behaviour (Kemp and Wright, 2008).  
• Data redundancy: third, the bulk of historical data available on a catchment’s 
behaviour may be able to produce predictions of mean and median river flow, 
for instance, however such syntheses provide no major insights into flood 
discharges; floodwaters describe a nonlinear flow once they exceed the 
riverbank which is, again, difficult to model without an abundance of 
historical examples. The location of flood discharge is a product of the 
timing and magnitude of flows, which are individual to each event (Cloke and 
Pappenberger, 2009: 617).  
• Data paucity: fourth, in cases where there are historical exemplars, 
measurements of river height, velocity or rate of rise may not be recorded or 
comprehensive, particularly as major flood events can sometimes exceed 
measuring devices and destroy measuring infrastructure.  
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This is not to suggest that refined predictions of flood occurrence and behaviour 
are not possible, but that they must necessarily manage these uncertainties. One 
prevalent way of doing this is through a flood study which, as Wenger et al. state, 
analyses different statistically probable rainfall scenarios and the stream flows 
expected to result from them in a particular catchment area (hydrology studies), as 
well as identifying flood behaviour in terms of flow rate, velocity, depth and extent 
(hydraulic studies). Further, they incorporate ‘historical flood data, surveys, 
vegetation cover, land use, topography, riverbed mapping, sediment movement 
behaviour and data from weather stations… [taking] account of numerous different 
variables, such as when and where rain falls in the catchment, the soil saturation 
level and dam levels, tides, predicted rain and even the effect of different dam 
operation strategies’. The correlate to such a flood study is a flood map, which 
visually represents how one or more flood events will likely be distributed across 
the catchment. In Australia, these syntheses are the responsibility of a catchment 
authority2 which are, in turn, reliant on centralised funding, subject to government 
pressure and often reliant on out-dated data (Barry, 2008). Recent floods in Victoria 
and Queensland have helped establish that there is ‘a wholly inadequate level of 
flood mapping’ in these regions (QFCI, 2012: 62). In Victoria, for example, a 1%AEP 
event has been mapped in 80 per cent of floodplains and incorporated into 
planning schemes in 56 per cent of cases (Comrie, 2011: 194-195), while only 37 per 
cent of Queensland’s planning scheme contain any flood-related mapping, less than 
a quarter of which meet current guidelines (Wenger et al., 2013: 20-25). It is 
important to note, also, that such flood information is often not publically available 
even where it exists (Box et al., 2012). As such, it is perhaps unsurprising that the 
Insurance Council of Australia has developed its own commercial-in-confidence 
National Flood Information Database (NFID) to store flood studies and other flood 
information (Van Den Honert and McAneney, 2011: 1169). 
 
Flood studies have many public and private applications but are foremost created 
as a basis for mitigation interventions. Globally, the major forms of mitigation 
interventions are engineering works such as dams, levees, detention basins (or ‘dry 
dams’), flood walls, land clearance, dredging, backflow prevention and evacuation 
infrastructure, and legal strictures such as land use planning and building codes 
(Fordham, 1999; Vojinović and Abbott, 2012: 459-474). Such interventions, as noted 
above, contain their own complex ‘explosions of uncertainty’ (Dessai et al., 2009) in 
that each comes with its own distinct set of effects and consequences that cannot 
be wholly anticipated in advance. The construction of dams and levees, for example, 
often produces a ‘safe development paradox’, or what geographer Gilbert White 
(1945) described as the ‘levee effect’ (see also Parker, 1995; Pielke, 1999; Smith, 
1998: 232-234; Burby, 2006; Atkins, 2009). Governments, developers and others 
often mistake engineering works for protection, subsequently reducing 	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
2 The names for these authorities vary across Australia: Catchment Management Authorities in Victoria; Local Land 
Services in New South Wales; Catchment Councils in Western Australia; Natural Resource Management Boards in 
South Australia and Queensland. Tasmania, ACT and the Northern Territory do not presently have equivalent sets 
of bodies. 
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development controls and placing more development in a ‘safe’ floodplain. Dams 
and levees can, in addition, badly affect ecosystems that rely on periodic flooding. 
As Lane et al. summarise (2011: 1787), such interventions alter ‘the spatial 
distribution of risk’ to both humans and non-humans in ways that effect risk 
creation and residual risk. The effect of planning interventions is equally difficult to 
anticipate, as such regulations can involve static assumptions about changing 
hazards (Godden and Kung, 2011) and sit within complex political-economic 
contexts in which regulations may be waived or not applied. In Queensland, for 
instance, it is essentially optional to consider flood maps in many development 
assessments, whereas in Victoria it is only compulsory if flood mapping exists in a 
given area (Wenger et al., 2013: 20-21). 
 
There are other uncertainties to be managed in predicting and mitigating flood 
hazards, though they are each fall within the categories already identified in this 
report. What has not yet been noted is the importance in flood mitigation of 
understanding at-risk assets, typically divided into the built environment and 
human population, though environmental values are increasingly being included. 
For the former, this may extend not simply to itineraries of cultural heritage, 
transport infrastructure, utilities and critical assets (electricity, sewerage, etc.), 
private properties and their respective elevations, but also their capacities and 
vulnerabilities in a probable flood event. The design of both flood preparation and 
response is informed, for example, by not only modelling the level at which point a 
roadway becomes inundated, and the likelihood of this inundation, but also the 
carrying capacity of the road and its role in evacuation (Cova and Church, 1997; 
Shekhar et al., 2012; Pillac et al., 2013). How many vehicles can travel over a given 
evacuation route in an hour? What is the sum of functioning vehicles amongst a 
population? How many will need emergency assistance? How can we calculate for 
human error? These variables and others, and their requisite uncertainties, are 
synthesised in order to assess evacuation planning and whether an evacuation can 
occur between forecasters being sufficiently certain about a coming event and that 
event’s occurrence. 
 
Equally, understanding at-risk populations is not only a matter of complex 
demographic calculations, but also significant sociological and psychological 
judgements regarding risk preparedness and behaviour. Over a decade ago, 
Handmer suggested that ‘advice on how flood water will actually affect people, and 
on appropriate action, is often minimalist or missing’ (2000: 6). Since this time a 
large body of research has emerged suggesting that the greatest uncertainties are 
not in providing warnings to populations but in making communities and 
emergency management agencies responsive to these warnings. In Australia, Keys 
and Cawood conclude (2009), the flaws are chiefly ‘cultural rather than technical’. 
This report is not positioned to detail the immense body of work that has been 
devoted to this topic, though it should be noted that multiple methods and 
evidence bases are utilised in considering effective and efficacious warnings, 
including experimental psychological and sociological studies to test correlations 
between risk communication, risk perception and preparedness (e.g. Bell and Tobin, 
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2007; Gigerenzer, 2003; Griffin et al., 2008; Terpstra et al., 2009; Visschers et al., 
2009; Baan and Klijn, 2004; Kellens et al., 2013), case studies of community 
responses to actual flood events (e.g. Pfister, 2002; Opper et al., 2006; Gissing et al., 
2010), and the broader literature on collaborative planning and community 
engagement (see Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003; Renn, 2008a; Healey, 2006; Head, 2007). 
 
Anticipating flood hazards and designing and implementing forms of flood risk 
mitigation are, as the above suggests, a complex and interdisciplinary business. As 
noted at the beginning of this section, others have suggested that flood science 
should ‘embrace uncertainty’ by adopting a risk-based understanding of its 
practices. Summarising those uncertainties addressed above, we might suggest that 
such an embrace in any one context would include consideration of: the forecasting 
confidence of meteorological data; the availability of hydrological data from past 
flood events and their use in test modelling; the existence of comprehensive flood 
studies and their relative availability to public and private users; the necessary 
unpredictability of interventions including both engineering works and legal 
strictures, their application and the forms of knowledge that underwrite them; the 
fallibilities and redundancies of the built environment; and, the heterogeneity of the 
given population. This report will now address these uncertainties in relation to a 
specific case study—the Hawkesbury-Nepean Valley—showing how the historical, 
economic and political particularities of a floodplain shape how we might know and 
manage a flood hazard. 
3.2: CASE STUDY: FLOOD RISK IN THE HAWKESBURY-NEPEAN VALLEY 
The Hawkesbury-Nepean Valley is an area comprised of the catchment of the 
Nepean and Hawkesbury rivers in Greater Western Sydney, New South Wales. While 
the first post-settler flood is recorded as occurring in 1795, geological analysis 
indicates that the area has been witness to significant flooding over thousands of 
years (Bewsher et al., 2013: 5; Johnson, 2000). Following several devastating floods, 
Governor Macquarie ordered in December 1810 that development should not take 
place on the low-lying floodplains, establishing the towns of Richmond, Windsor, 
Pitt Town, Wilberforce and Castlereagh on what he believed to be flood proof sites. 
But Macquarie’s planning was based on a very limited flood record and in 1867 
many of these towns were completely overwhelmed by floodwaters. Twelve people 
were killed in the largest recorded flood, the Hawkesbury River reaching a height 
calculated as having a 1:200 to 1:300 chance of occurring in any given year. Since 
this time there have been over twenty ‘major’ floods in the valley in which 
infrastructure has been inundated and communities isolated. As Bewsher et al. note 
(2013: 2), there are many buildings with significant flood exposure in the valley, a 
risk that is not evenly distributed between different areas. The suburbs of McGraths 
Hill and South Windsor are, in particular, vulnerable to inundation in 2%AEP flood 
events. An estimated 73,000 people live in areas prone to flooding in the valley (DPI, 
2014: 5). 
 
Geographically, there are three significant factors to note about the floodplain.  
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• The first is the presence of the 142 metre high Warragamba Dam. Built 
between 1948 and 1960 to secure a potable water supply for Sydney city, the 
dam impounds several rivers north of the Warragamba’s confluence with the 
Nepean River to create one of the largest reservoirs for urban water supply in 
the world, Lake Burragorang, within the Blue Mountains National Park. After 
various reviews between the 1960s and 1980s revealed that the dam’s 
original spillway was built to withstand a flood less than half the size of the 
modelled PMF (Deen et al., 1989), the dam wall was strengthened and raised 
by 5 metres in the late 1980s, while a larger auxiliary spillways was built 
between 1999 and 2009. While the dam was not built to mitigate flood risk, it 
both reduces the amount of water normally entering into the Valley system 
(Warner, 2014) and creates a capacity to add significant amounts of flood 
water to the Hawkesbury-Nepean system, whether through dam failure or to 
prevent the ‘topping’ of the dam wall. 
• Secondly, the topography of the floodplain itself presents a very low profile 
that is conducive to a ponding or ‘bathtub effect’. Below the Warragamba 
Dam, the Penrith floodplain flows into Castlereagh Gorge which then opens 
into the Richmond-Windsor floodplain before narrowing again into Sackville 
Gorge. In a flood event, the two gorges act as ‘choke’ points, delaying the 
outflow of floodwaters and raising flood levels within the floodplains.  
• Third, the floodplain includes the existence of ‘islands’ or sites which are 
encircled by floodwaters in major flood events. McGraths Hill, for example, 
would become an isolated island in 5%AEP flood event and would be 
inundated in a 1%AEP flood event. This means that, in the latter event, 
McGraths Hill would first be isolated and then inundated. 
In the words of one 2006 State government report, the Valley ‘has been described as 
exhibiting a combination of the worst characteristics of riverine flooding (depth and 
extent), and the worst characteristics of flash flooding (rapid rise of floodwaters 
and limited warning time)’ (Hawkesbury-Nepean Floodplain Management Steering 
Committee, 2006: 11).  
 
The risk equation of probabilities and consequences is presently shifting in the 
Hawkesbury-Nepean Valley. Between the 1986 and 2006 Censuses, the total number 
of persons in the floodplain increased by 17,000 and dwellings increased by 7,700 
(HCC, 2012a: 137). This level of growth, while remarkable, will be dwarfed if recent 
planning decisions by State government agencies are realised.  
• In 2007, the New South Wales Department of Planning’s Northwest 
Subregional Strategy set a target of 5,000 extra dwellings within the 
Hawkesbury LGA by 2031. Proposals to meet this target include Bligh Park 
Stage 2 (North Bligh Park) and Pitt Town, each involving the creation of 
approximately 800 lots (HCC, 2012a: 137). Much of Bligh Park Stage 2 (North 
Bligh Park) is beneath the 1%AEP flood level. 
• 2,500 new dwellings scheduled for Vineyard, on the eastern edge of the 
floodplain, as part of the North-West Growth Centre of 60,000 extra 
dwellings. 
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• A target of 25,000 new dwellings was set for Penrith in the same period, 
including the Penrith Lakes development of 5,000 new dwellings in flood 
prone land adjacent to the Nepean River.  
As might be expected, the different agencies involved in actualising these plans 
each have their own preferences in regards to the magnitude and distribution of 
new development and, therefore, in the magnitude and distribution of risk 
mitigation and residual risk. At the same time, preliminary surveys suggest that 
despite the high flood risk of the area, ‘severe flooding is perceived as a remote 
event which is easily dismissed or denied’ by residents (Gillespie et al., 2002: 28). 
One 2008 survey suggested that 70 per cent of residents were unaware they lived in 
a flood prone area (Becker et al., 2008). These indicators are unlikely to improve as 
more people without major flood experience move into this high risk floodplain. At 
the same time, the effects of climate change are predicted to alter the probability of 
major flood events occurring. For instance, as Bewsher Consulting (2012a: 18) have 
shown, a flood event with a 1:100 probability of occurring in any given year would 
have a 1:80 probability were annual rainfall to increase by 5 per cent. Geographer 
Robin Warner (2014: 374) states that precipitation in the Valley’s catchment could 
change by +7 to –13 per cent by 2030 and by +20 to –40 per cent by 2070. Such 
climactic scenarios present a very broad spectrum of flood scenarios. 
 
The statuses of other aspects of the flood risk equation in the Hawkesbury-Nepean 
floodplain are less clear. Several sections of the floodplain’s evacuation routes—
such as the M4 (Western Motorway), State Highway 44 (Great Western Highway) and 
the M7 (Westlink)—are prone to inundation in major flood events, potentially 
leading to the isolation of communities (Molino Stewart, 2012; Pillac et al., 2013). As 
such, one significant aspect of flood risk mitigation in the floodplain is evacuation 
planning (Opper et al., 2010; HCC, 2012a: 82-90). As elsewhere, the envelope within 
which evacuation must occur is determined by forecast certainty, and in the Valley 
the Bureau of Meteorology can predict flood events approximately 9 hours in 
advance with 95 per cent certainty (HCC, 2012a: D1-3). Subsequently, Opper et al. 
have attempted to calculate the number of buildings with and without vehicles to 
be evacuated, the number of buildings with containing vulnerable people, as well as 
introducing several suppositions as proxies for predicted human behaviour. For 
example, they suggest that traffic can flow at approximately 600 vehicles per lane 
per hour, but that a ‘traffic safety factor’ of 1-2 hours should be introduced to such 
calculations to account for delays due to accidents. Other proxies include a warning 
time (number of house to be warned, multiplied by 5 minutes per house and 
divided by the number of warning teams), a 1 hour ‘warning lag factor’ (the delay 
between warning delivery and being prepared for evacuation) and a 1 hour ‘warning 
acceptance factor’ (the delay between a warning and its subjective acceptance), all 
of which attempt to incorporate the manifold uncertainties of ‘the human factor’. 
Such evacuation timelines, in turn, reveal the importance and influence of 
evacuation infrastructure. As such, the widening and raising of evacuation routes is 
currently the subject of a multi-agency review which is inquiring into the feasibility 
of multiple risk mitigation measures, including dredging waterways, excavating the 
gorges and raising the height of Warragamba Dam. 
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While some hold that it is better to focus upon non-structural forms of mitigation, 
such as planning reform (Smith et al., 1996; Bewsher et al., 2013), the major reviews 
of flood risk in the valley that have occurred since 1980 have been devoted to 
weighing the benefits of major infrastructural intervention, particularly the raising 
of the Warragamba Dam wall or ‘crest’ (e.g. Gutteridge, 1980; HNFMAC, 1997; HCC, 
2012a; DPI, 2014). In 1995, a government assessment of a $300 million proposal to 
raise the dam wall suggested the reduction in predicted flood damages justified the 
cost, though the newly-elected Carr state government vetoed the proposal on the 
basis of environmental concerns and appended a $111 million auxiliary spillway to 
the dam instead. The initial report of the current review suggests that raising the 
dam wall is the ‘most effective option for… mitigating regional downstream 
flooding’ with estimated costs of ‘between a half and one billion dollars’ (DPI, 2014: 
27). But such engineering works will not eliminate flood risk, particularly given the 
hydrological role of the Nepean and Grose Rivers, or the need for accurate 
emergency flood prediction. 
 
As already indicated, development planning is a significant factor in regional flood 
risk, in part due to New South Wales’ chequered history regarding flood mapping 
and its disclosure to the public. As Handmer states (1985; also Box et al., 2013), 
government flood policy in New South Wales underwent a series of reversals 
between 1977 and 1984, beginning with a commitment to remove subsidies for 
those developing in flood prone land and to map floodplains. The state government 
subsequently retreated from flood mapping, while the federal Environmental 
Planning and Assessment (EPA) Act 1979 and two 1982 legal decisions made clear 
that local governments were responsible for taking flood risk into account in 
development planning decisions and, therefore, legally liable for the consequences. 
In New South Wales, pressure from the Liberal Party in 1983 and 1984 regarding the 
effect of flood mapping on property values led the Wran administration (1976-
1986) to abolish 1%AEP as a planning standard and to make its own flood maps 
unavailable. As a recent state government report states, today there is ‘no strategic 
governance framework for coordinating data collection’ and no single source of 
information on flood risk (DPI, 2014: 17-19). At the same time, the Hawkesbury 
Local Environment Plan 1989 prohibits buildings beneath a modelled 10%AEP level 
while permitting them above the 1%AEP level, treating proposals within the 
intervening zone on a case-by-case basis. This approach to development planning is 
both insufficiently cautious and insufficiently strategic (see HCC, 2012g). 
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This section has sought to give a 
broad view of the forms of knowledge, 
uncertainties and major political, 
social and geographic factors shaping 
flood risk and flood risk mitigation in 
the Valley today. There are other 
factors to consider to gain a holistic 
sense of flood risk in the 
Hawkesbury-Nepean Valley—including 
community education, community 
preparedness, and warning systems of 
specific communities—though these 
are categorised as risk transference 
for the purposes of this report. It is 
apparent that the dominant concerns 
in flood risk mitigation today are the 
role of Warragamba Dam and flood 
prediction in relation to development 
and evacuation planning. This 
indicates that further qualitative 
research into this case study should begin by engaging with practitioners involved 
in these concerns and inquiring into the key uncertainties surveyed here, including 
the influence of Warragamba Dam in flood behaviour, the parameters of flood 
planning levels, the role of climate change in flood prediction parameters, and the 
calculation of human populations. 
3.3: BUSHFIRE 
The loss of life and property to bushfire has long been an abiding concern to rural 
and remote residents, particularly in the large eucalypt forests of Australia’s south 
and southeast and the grasslands of northern Australia’s tropical savannah. The 
‘Universal Australian,’ to quote Pyne (1991), the eucalypt is ‘a fire creature’ as it 
produces abundant fuel loads in the form of bark—as well as volatile organic 
compounds—and is unusually dependent on regular wildfire for regeneration 
(Adams and Attiwill, 2011: 27-38). Every day of the week now implicitly 
commemorates a catastrophic fire in the south and southeast, including Black 
Thursday in 1851, Black Monday in 1865, Red Tuesday in 1898, Black Sunday in 
1926, Black Friday in 1939, Black Tuesday in 1967, Ash Wednesday in 1983, and 
Black Saturday in 2009. Black Saturday fires led to 173 fatalities and the burning of 
450,000 hectares in Victoria, while Ash Wednesday fires led to 47 fatalities in 
Victoria and 28 fatalities in South Australia. Other major fires have also claimed 
properties and thousands of hectares, such as the 2003 Canberra bushfire, which 
left over 490 people injured and 4 fatalities. This history gives some indication as 
to why bushfire is a major concern for governments and emergency service 
agencies, amongst others, a concern that is growing as more individuals choose to 
live in the rural and peri-urban fringe, fire seasons begin earlier and fire weather 
becomes more severe (Hughes and Steffen, 2013). Thus, major efforts have been 
BOX 3 
Major issues in flood risk distribution and flood risk 
mitigation in the Hawkesbury-Nepean Valley: 
• Warragamba Dam, which was built using 
now-dated flood estimates; the ‘bathtub’ 
effect of two gorges; multiple ‘islands’ that are 
isolated and/or inundated in major floods. 
• Both municipal and state government 
committed to creating more housing within 
floodplain. 
• Evacuation infrastructure prone to inundation; 
evacuation planning manages 
meteorological and human behaviour 
uncertainties. 
• History of government fixation on engineering 
solutions to flood risk and limited availability of 
flood mapping. 
• Use of ‘one-hundred-year flood’ in mitigation 
disputed, as Probable Maximum Flood 
significantly higher. 
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devoted in the past to attempting to measure and mitigate this risk, particularly in 
areas with large eucalypt coverage.  
 
The scientific knowledge applied in bushfire risk mitigation is subject to 
uncertainties parallel to those encountered in flood risk mitigation, particularly in 
regards to the modelling and prediction of the hazard. Fire behaviour might be 
regarded as a ‘golem science’, to use Collins and Evans’ term, in that the field is 
both relatively settled while remaining a source of continuing mysteries and 
continuing discovery (e.g. McRae et al., 2013). Thus, while the physics of fire 
behaviour are comparatively well understood, the behaviour of actual bushfires 
remains difficult to anticipate due to the extreme localisation of fire dynamics and 
their responsiveness to variability in three factors that are difficult to measure: fuel 
load, fuel type and wind speed (see Cruz et al., 2012a). While a region may have an 
archetypical weather pattern—and therefore archetypical dynamics regarding fire 
spread—it is not always possible to accurately model a particular fire’s behaviour in 
advance at the level of, for instance, the distribution of firebrands by ambient 
winds or convection columns (known as ‘spotting’) (Pastor et al., 2003: 145-147; 
Saeedian et al., 2010). As is discussed further in the case study, while fire intensity 
and fire damage can be modelled from given ignition points under given weather 
conditions, ignition points themselves are more difficult to predict. A related point 
is that—as in flood prediction—attempts to model future fires are typically 
validated through comparing model outputs and empirical data from an historical 
fire event. Such models are, to a varying degree, reliant upon sometimes limited 
data regarding past ‘worst case’ events that are, by definition, relatively rare. The 
data unpinning these aspects in any model must be the object of scrutiny if we are 
to understand the levels of speculation and ‘model tuning’ that are operating within 
a prediction and mitigation scheme. Tuning occurs where coefficients, equations or 
other aspects underpinning a model are adjusted without a scientific justification 
to produce closer agreement between predictions with observations (Sundberg, 
2009: 170). 
 
As noted earlier, interventions to mitigate bushfire risk such as prescribed burning, 
building codes, fire prevention works, or new planning laws are themselves complex 
‘explosions of uncertainty’. Risk of house ignition can occur through a variety of 
vectors, including through embers or burning debris carried by the wind, heat 
radiation, direct flame contact, or wind damage allowing the entry of embers and 
burning debris. The effects of restrictive building and planning codes on lowering 
vulnerability to these forms of ignition are, in particular, difficult to either 
anticipate or measure in Australia because they are a novelty (see Groenhart et al., 
2012). Between 2009 and 2011 two major reforms occurred in Victoria, the first 
being the implementation of a new building standard prescribing mandatory 
construction requirements for new buildings in bushfire prone areas (Standards 
Australia, 2009a), the second being the creation of a planning overlay (Bushfire 
Management Overlay) prescribing other requirements relating to access, water 
supply, and proximity to vegetation (Chang-Richards et al., 2013). It is too early to 
report on the effect of these mitigation strategies, particularly as they relate solely 
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to new developments. Nonetheless, there is a significant body of research 
examining the effect of fuel treatments (such as slashing), building materials and 
building design on house losses in the wildland-urban interface (Ramsay and 
Rudolph, 2003; Ramsay et al., 1996; Leonard and McArthur, 1999; Ager et al., 2010; 
Mell et al., 2010; Leonard et al., 2009). The micro-dynamics of actual bushfires, 
variability in housing stock and the ability for management activity during a 
bushfire to effect house loss all present major difficulties in attempting to 
scientifically verify the effect of these forms of mitigation on house loss.  
 
In Australia, prescribed burning is the dominant form of risk mitigation, presenting 
a long history as an ‘Australian strategy’ bolstered periodically by government 
responses to catastrophic fires (Pyne, 1991: 338-363). Between January and March 
1961, for instance, a series of massive bushfires burned through southwest Western 
Australia, largely destroying the towns of Dwellingup and Karridale and 
significantly damaging others. A Royal Commission led by G.J. Rodger subsequently 
called for a renewed focus on research into fire behaviour and fuel abatement, 
following which the State’s Forests Department initiated an intensive program of 
fuel-reduction burning on state lands, averaging about 300,000 hectares between 
1961 and 1990. Prescribed burning programs have been adopted in all other states, 
most generally treating 2 per cent of Crown lands in a given year (Adams and 
Attiwill, 2011: 75-76). A significant amount of research produced on fuel-reduction 
burning suggests that as the average area burnt for fuel reduction increases the 
average area burnt by bushfires decreases (Sneeuwjagt, 2008; Boer et al., 2009). In 
other words, the supposition is that reducing fuels decreases the intensity and rate 
of spread of subsequent bushfires, though the efficacy of these treatments in 
reducing losses is dependent on other factors such as the geographic pattern of 
burns and the proximity of treated areas to at-risk assets (Bradstock et al., 2012c; 
Gill and Stephens, 2009). 
 
To be clear, prescribed burning sometimes refers to any controlled application of 
low intensity or high intensity fire, including for the purposes of reducing fine fuels, 
modifying or renewing habitats for specific species, or regenerating forests after 
timber harvesting, though the dominant meaning in Australia is in relation to fuel 
reduction. A specific prescribed burning program is examined in the following case 
study, but it is useful for the purposes of this review to briefly note some of the 
most significant uncertainties in the science and practice of prescribed burning for 
risk mitigation (see McCarthy and Tolhurst, 2001; Boer et al., 2009; Bradstock et al., 
2012a).  
• Quantifying additionality: first, quantifying the benefit of prescribed burning 
is a difficult task as it relies on calculations of the probabilities and 
consequences of two abstractions. Put differently, the benefit (or 
‘additionality’) of prescribed burning is a product of the calculable difference 
in terms of fire intensity, loss of human life and property, and/or economic 
impact between a modelled control scenario and a treated environment. As 
indicated in the second section, such models are the product of a variety of 
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uncertainties relating to the depth and strength of historical data on 
vegetation, previous fires, population, and so on.  
• Validating predictions: second, the ability of prescribed burns to 
meaningfully reduce the intensity of fires in extreme weather conditions 
remains open to academic debate (Bradstock et al., 2012a: 66-67; see also 
Keeley and Zedler, 2009). As in flood, there are significant issues relating to 
the validation of predictions given that the effectiveness of a prescribed 
burning program is best demonstrated only after an extremely rare hazard 
event.  
• Translation processes: third, the translation of strategic modelling into a 
prescribed burning program involves another set of uncertainties relating to 
operational implementation, highlighting again how implementation is 
equally as complex as research. For instance, it may not be possible to burn 
given units of land due to weather conditions, isolation or, conversely, their 
proximity to human life and property. Another operational uncertainty 
relates to the collection of data after a prescribed burn, as the validation 
predicted fuel reduction is subsequently fed back into the next round of 
predictive modelling.  
• Intervention effects: fourth, as Clode and Elgar note (2014: 1193), there 
remain ‘significant concerns about the health, safety, and ecological impact 
of broad-scale prescribed burning’ (see also Clarke, 2008). In order to 
estimate the ecological impact of prescribed burning, for example, ecologists 
have attempted to map landscapes in terms of vegetation classes and their 
minimum and maximum tolerance for intervals between fires (‘tolerable fire 
interval’ or TFI, see Burrows, 2008). Such envelopes are nonetheless 
estimates and, as such, there is a risk that their lower limits will be treated as 
unproblematic guides for policy planning. Prescribed burning is a mitigation 
tool supported by a body of scientific research, but practitioners and 
decision-makers must remain alert to its assumptions and uncertainties.  
 
This report will now address these uncertainties in relation to a specific case 
study—the Barwon-Otway area—showing how the historical, economic and political 
particularities of this place shape how we might know and manage a bushfire 
hazard, and how science is engaged in that work. 
 
3.4: CASE STUDY: FIRE RISK IN THE BARWON-OTWAY AREA 
The Barwon-Otway area is the eastern subsection of the Barwon South West district 
of southwestern Victoria, on the rolling coast east of Melbourne. The area includes 
three municipal councils, comprising the entirety of Surf Coast Shire and sections 
of Colac Otway Shire and Corangamite Shire. At the 2011 Census, the area’s 
population was approximately 290,000 people, most living in the city of Geelong 
and its surrounds; Surf Coast Shire and Colac-Otway Shire have fulltime resident 
populations of approximately 25,000 and 20,000 respectively (ABS 2011). The 
largest towns are Torquay and Colac, which each make up approximately 4 per cent 
of the region’s population, and Camperdown and Anglesea, which each make up 
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approximately 1 per cent of the region’s population (DEPI, 2014). Many of these 
towns are growing quickly, and between 2005 and 2011 Torquay’s population grew 
by 48 per cent. The area also features townships of 200-300 people—such as 
Forrest, Fairhaven, Wye River and Kennett River—that are either wholly or largely 
surrounded by eucalypt forest and possess limited or very limited evacuation 
infrastructure. Presently, the demographic future of the area is being assessed 
through the Barwon South West Regional Strategic Plan 2012–2015, though an early 
report suggests the region’s population will grow by at least a third between 2012 
and 2022 (see Regional Development Australia, 2013). Notably, a comparatively 
high number of properties in the Surf Coast Shire are holiday homes. This is 
demonstrated by the fact that, first, approximately 17 per cent of residential 
properties in Surf Coast Shire are owners’ second homes and, second, censes 
indicate that 60-70 per cent of residential properties in coastal towns such as 
Anglesea and Lorne are unoccupied in winter (see ABS 2011 and Frost, 2003). Such 
high numbers of seasonal residents can present obstacles to bushfire risk education 
and mitigation (Bright and Burtz, 2006). 
 
Economically, the Barwon-Otway area has two main industries—tourism and dairy 
production—which are loosely divided geographically between the northwest and 
southeast. The fact that Barwon South West is Australia’s largest dairy production 
region (Regional Development Australia, 2013) is only apparent in the Barwon-
Otway area near Colac and its surrounds. To the south and southeast, Colac is 
separated from the coast by the forested Otway Ranges.3 The major draw cards for 
the estimated seven million visitors who come to Barwon-Otway area annually are:  
• The 103,000-hectare Great Otway National Park, and other large tracts of 
State Forest such as the Anglesea Heath.  
• The Twelve Apostles, distinctive limestone stacks near Port Campbell. 
• The Great Ocean Road, a coastal road which winds along the coast from 
Torquay through to Warnambool built between 1919 and 1932 to 
commemorate the soldiers who fought in World War I (see Kerr, 2013).  
As such, bushfire risk is highest during the summer months, not only because this 
is the period during which conditions for catastrophic bushfires are at their worst, 
but also because this is the time during which a large number of short-term 
domestic and international visitors rapidly come to the region to enjoy the weather, 
beaches and bush land. This influx of an at-risk population with little awareness of 
bushfire risk potentially affects bushfire risk mitigation strategies. It is reasonable 
to suppose that, in a area which relies heavily on the tourist season and the 
preservation of wilderness values, some sectors of the community will not 
necessarily support the closing of roads during extreme bushfire risk conditions or 
the charred grasslands, smoke and access restrictions that are a requisite part of 
prescribed burning. 
 
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
3 The Great Otway National Park was established in June 2005 on the basis of Otway National Park, four existing 
State Parks and other Crown lands. 
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The Barwon-Otway area, like other comparable sites in Australia’s southeast, is a 
high bushfire risk area because it is at risk of bushfires that are low probability but 
extremely high consequence. The particularly elevated level of bushfire risk in this 
area is a combination of three factors:  
• First, the area’s forests exhibit an abundance of old-growth eucalypts 
(particularly mountain ash (E. regnans)) and their litter in large contiguous 
areas of flammable heath and forest. This fuel, under the right conditions, is 
capable of creating a catastrophic crown fire with abundant spotting.  
• Second, the extensive wildland urban interface of coastland towns such as 
Lorne, Anglesea, Aireys Inlet, Wye River and Fairhaven, where resident and 
tourist populations are in close proximity to forested areas. 
• Third, the typical regional weather pattern produces strong dry 
northwesterly winds followed by a southwesterly ‘cool change’ moving in 
from the sea later in the day.  
These three factors combined are capable of creating intense firestorms that do 
much of their damage in the space of a day, first burning in a narrow southerly 
direction through contiguous forest to create what, following a perpendicular ‘cool 
change’, can turn into a wide fire front threatening a large number of lives and 
structures along the coastline (e.g. Cruz et al., 2012b). Several of the catastrophic 
post-settlement fires to affect the Barwon-Otway area followed this pattern, such as 
the Ash Wednesday fire in February 1983, a firestorm that started in Dean’s Marsh 
and burnt through 41,000 hectares between Lorne and Anglesea, destroying 782 
buildings and killing 3 people (Bardsley et al., 1983; Mills, 2005). Other major post-
settlement fires include the January 1914 and January 1919 fires, and Black Friday 
fire of January 1939 which claimed one family near Barongarook. 
 
As noted earlier, the dominant mitigation strategy in southeastern Australia is 
prescribed burning, which is used to decrease the prospective intensity of bushfires 
to limit their damage and aid fire suppression. During the Victorian Bushfires Royal 
Commission into the Black Saturday fires (see 2009), many experts identified the 
high fuel loads and lack of prescribed burning in the Yarra Valley and Central 
Gippsland as key contributors to the fires’ intensity, as well as identifying the role 
of infrastructural deficits, planning laws and fire safety advice in the high number 
of fatalities (VBRC, 2010; see also ENRC, 2008). Thus, a major Royal Commission 
recommendation, subsequently adopted by the Victorian government, was to treat 
at least 5 per cent—and up to 8 per cent—of public land per year with prescribed 
burning. However, the adoption of prescribed burning in Victoria is conditioned by 
factors other than its scientific basis. First, because state agencies hold legal 
responsibility for public lands, they necessarily have considerably more discretion 
over their treatment than private lands. Prescribed burning requires significant 
preparation works—such as the bulldozing of ‘fuel breaks’—which could effect 
financial, ecological and social utility for landholder’s when conducted on private 
lands. A number of other considerations must still be taken into account by 
agencies conducting burns, including protected species, smoke hazard (both to the 
public and agriculture), and appropriate weather conditions. Second, other public 
land mitigation strategies, such as vegetation thinning, have significantly higher 
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infrastructure and labour costs. Third, while a significant amount of vegetation, and 
therefore bushfire risk, resides on private land, transaction costs for implementing 
bushfire risk mitigation on private land are higher. This includes, for instance, the 
costs to government involved in issuing fire prevention notices to landholders 
requiring works to fire hazards and negotiating permission and land access for 
works.4 Fourth, there are both political and economic obstacles to implementing 
other mitigation strategies on public and private land, often because they inflict 
costs on stakeholders. These include compulsorily acquiring high-risk properties, 
creating more restrictive building and planning codes, or compelling electricity 
companies to move ignition hazards, all of which were recommended by the 
Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission and have faced significant opposition (see 
McLennan et al., 2014; Rhodes, 2012).  
 
The contiguity of forested public lands makes the Barwon-Otway area both high 
risk and conducive to the dominant mitigation method. Nonetheless, planning and 
implementing prescribed burning is extremely complex, not only in its production 
of scientific knowledge but also in their application and translation for community 
stakeholders. Some of the most highly treatable public lands in the Barwon-Otway 
area are the foothill forests and heathlands between Anglesea and Lorne, areas 
where the effects of prescribed burning—smoke, restricted access, potential for 
uncontrolled bushfires—sometimes clash with the values and expectations of 
residents and visitors. In some circumstances, those planning and executing burns 
have to work against community perceptions of prescribed burning as ineffective or 
unsafe. In November 1994, two houses in Moggs Creek, a small community south of 
Aireys Inlet, were destroyed when a prescribed burn jumped containment lines (see 
Tippet, 1994; Faulkner, 1994; Schauble, 1994). Such incidents can have long-term 
effects on community trust (see Winter et al., 2004; Lijeblad et al., 2009). Meanwhile, 
less populated areas such as the rainforest in the west of the region are 
significantly harder to treat, due to the moisture of the fuels outside bushfire 
season. Also, while prescribed burning is a scientifically informed practice, it is not 
a solution to bushfire risk. As DEPI has stated, modelling suggests that residual risk 
has a theoretical minimum of 10 per cent in the Barwon-Otway area, meaning that 
were all public lands to be treated simultaneously—which is not legally or 
practically possible—the risk to built assets would still be 10 per cent of the 
baseline rather than zero. State action is not a complete answer. 
 
Parallel to the Victorian government’s renewed focus on prescribed burning, over 
the past decade the state agency responsible for public lands, the Department of 
Environment and Primary Industries (DEPI) 5 , has piloted the use of ensemble 
forecasting software to inform prescribed burning strategies. In 2005, the 
Department began the Future Fire Management Project with researchers supported 
by the Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre (see Bushfire CRC, 2013) and partners 
in Parks Victoria and other agencies, focusing on the two pilot study areas: the 	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
4 Under the Country Fire Authority Act 1958 (Vic) s. 42. 
5 Previously the Department of Sustainability and Environment, and recently renamed the Department of 
Environment, Land, Water & Planning 
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Barwon-Otway area and the Central Highlands. The aim of this project was to 
evaluate the outcomes of different fuel management regimes in terms of reducing 
risk to life and property, biodiversity, timber and water quality and yield impacts, 
using PHOENIX RapidFire, a program able to ‘both visualise and quantify the 
potential effect of fuel reduction activities on bushfire risk across both public and 
private land’ (Ackland et al., 2014; see also Duff et al., 2013; Tolhurst et al., 2014). 
In short, data relating to topography, weather, fuel load (vegetation mapping and 
fire history), asset locations, and ignition locations are loaded into the modelling 
software to generate predictions of fire spread and intensity for hypothetical fires 
lit under ‘worst case scenario’ weather conditions. Using ignitions across a 5 
kilometre grid, it models single-day single-ignition fires under multiple fuel 
treatment scenarios to, in turn, demonstrate the potential efficacy of a burning 
program. The core of this approach is ‘residual risk’, understood as the remaining 
risk to built assets—used as a proxy for other losses—after prescribed burning 
treatment when measured against a purely theoretical control in which no fires 
occur whatsoever (State of Victoria, 2013: 1-7). It is estimated that increased and 
more strategic planned burning after 2007 has lowered residual risk in the Barwon-
Otway area from nearly 80 per cent to approximately 60 per cent. Importantly, this 
risk-based approach differs for the ‘5 per cent’ activity-based target otherwise used 
by the Victorian government to measure mitigation. 
 
A high risk area with comparatively treatable fuels, the Barwon-Otway area is a 
good site to test the efficacy of prescribed burning in mitigating risk to multiple 
values and assets. Amongst its benefits, the state’s forecasting program is able to 
make synthetic abstractions visible and material, simulating a catastrophic event 
the like of which has not occurred in the region for over 30 years and is thus 
outside many residents’ experience. It is also founded on Geographical Information 
System (GIS) technology, meaning that spatially dynamic entities and spatially static 
entities can be incorporated into the forecasts as topographical ‘layers’. Data on the 
addresses of vulnerable people—that is people with limited abilities to defend their 
home from bushfire—can be used to show how they might be affected under 
different scenarios, while historical data on lightning strike locations can be mined 
to predict likely future ignition points. Another layer, presently being developed for 
incorporation within the system, attempts to measure biodiversity in order to better 
incorporate such values into decision-making. The landscape is thus divided up into 
spatial units and each unit, using collated data on species populations, is assigned a 
Geometric Mean Abundance of Species value (see Kelly et al., 2014). As in the use of 
address point data as a proxy for human life and property, here a synthetic 
abstraction is made to stand in for elusive real world flora and fauna. The 
innovative approaches are now being expanded across the State’s seven bushfire 
‘catchments’ through the Victorian Bushfire Risk Profiles initiative, though it is 
important for anyone assessing such mitigation efforts to remain clear about the 
simulations in play and their innate, and sometimes obscure, uncertainties. On the 
one hand, limitations in species population data, or uncertain correlations between 
the presence of one (measured) species with another (unmeasured) species, can 
impose significant confidence limits on any corresponding risk calculation. On the 
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other hand, it is possible that 
emergent measures of risk may reveal 
that current programs focused on 
reducing risk to human life and 
property are harming assets and 
values such as biodiversity. 
 
This section has sought to give a 
broad view of the knowledge practices 
and major political, social and 
geographic factors shaping bushfire 
risk and bushfire risk mitigation in the 
Barwon-Otway area. There are other 
factors to consider in trying to gain a 
holistic sense of bushfire risk in the 
region—demography, community 
preparedness, warning systems and so 
on—though these are categorised as 
risk transference for the purposes of 
this report. Nonetheless, it is apparent 
that the dominant concerns in bushfire risk today are the reduction of fuel on 
public and private lands. This indicates that further qualitative research into this 
case study should begin by engaging with practitioners involved in these concerns 
and inquiring into key uncertainties surveyed here, including the verification of 
PHOENIX RapidFire, the ability of PHOENIX RapidFire model spatially dynamic 
assets and processes of translation that occur between modelling and operations. 
Further research should also examine the apparent lack of attention paid in 
available literature to evacuation planning as a bushfire risk mitigation strategy in 
the Barwon-Otway area. 
 
BOX 4 
Major issues in bushfire risk distribution and bushfire risk 
mitigation in the Barwon-Otway area: 
• Significant numbers of growing coastal 
townships; high numbers of seasonal residents 
and high number of seasonal visitors during 
bushfire season. 
• Contiguous flammable heath and forestlands; 
extensive wildland-urban interface; prevailing 
weather pattern capable of catastrophic fire 
event. 
• Dominant mitigation strategy is fuel reduction 
burning to reduce risk to life and property; 
other mitigation strategies more costly and 
politically contentious; some parties oppose 
burning.  
• New innovative approached used to plan 
and quantify mitigation; significant 
uncertainties surrounding impact of 
prescribed burning on flora and fauna; similar 
uncertainties likely to emerge from measuring 
risks to other assets and values. 
	
  33 	
  
4: CONCLUSION 
 
The first section of this report presented a framework for understanding risk and 
risk mitigation as complex phenomenon emerging within specific contexts and 
‘local knowledge practices’. How we understand a risk, and the relative 
responsibilities of different parties to mitigate that risk, is a product of social, 
economic, and political factors that include the development and local availability 
of measuring apparatus, archives, and synthesisers. Having now reviewed a wide 
array of literature covering the scientific practices and scientific uncertainties in 
bushfire and flood risk mitigation, it is useful to re-categorise the forms of 
uncertainty encountered in this review. It is anticipated that these categories will 
prove useful to future research within the Scientific Diversity and Scientific 
Uncertainty in Risk Mitigation Policy and Planning project, as well as helping guide 
other social science researchers and qualitative research projects engaging with the 
complex practices of risk mitigation professionals. The discrete categorisation of 
uncertainties may also be useful to risk mitigation professionals themselves in 
informing their own attempts to explain risk and justify mitigation practices both 
to other risk mitigation professionals and to the public. 
 
The following are the three categories of scientific uncertainties drawn from this 
report: 
1. Historicist uncertainties: those uncertainties which emerge from the reliance 
of scientific knowledge on archives of historical data. These include: 
uncertainties that stem from variations in metrics and the gaps in data 
collection; uncertainties due to the impossibility of certain types and 
volumes of data; uncertainties the variability in the availability of data; and 
uncertainties due to the variability in the syntheses of data between different 
parties. If, returning to Lane et al., ‘the futures imagined are tied to pasts 
experienced,’ then historicist uncertainties are those owed to the limited 
availability of the past in the present. 
2. Instrumental uncertainties: those uncertainties which emerge from the 
limitations of a given apparatus, heuristic or theory. As this report shows, 
different scientific theories and tools may be used in risk mitigation for a 
number of overlapping reasons. The use of a technique or apparatus may be 
justified by: its superior operational efficiency; its being within the limits of 
available resources; its having been adopted as an industry standards; or, its 
being the leading application of existing validated research findings. Each 
such ‘instrument’ will be a ‘local knowledge practice’ with inherent 
uncertainties owing to its parameters, design and development. 
3. Interventionist uncertainties: those uncertainties which emerge from a 
given mitigation intervention, meaning the uncertainties involved in 
predicting and/or calculating the effect of an intervention.  Arguably, a vast 
number of activities might be thought of as interventions, though this report 
is solely focused on those that are undertaken intentionally by governments 
to reduce a hazard’s probabilities and/or consequences. Relevant 
	
  34 	
  
interventions include strategic planning exercises, legal reforms, policy 
changes, and engineering works, amongst others, all of which attempt to 
manage a risk, often by geographically and/or temporally redistributing it. 
All such interventions are ‘explosions of uncertainty’ with effects that, first, 
can and should be scientifically quantified in advance and, second, 
nonetheless cannot be wholly predicted by scientific methods. 
A summary table is provided at the end of this report (see Table 1). 
 
It is worth noting the existence of another category of uncertainties that are 
correlated to scientific knowledge but are not themselves scientific, and are 
therefore excluded from this categorisation. Translation uncertainties are those 
uncertainties which emerge from the translation of scientific knowledge into 
practice by individuals, institutions and agencies. This report has, for example, only 
touched briefly on the many difficulties of translating or transferring risk—as it is 
made legible to and by risk professionals—into action by residents within an at-risk 
site. To revisit the standardised definition of risk, it is important to understand that 
risk fluctuates because both probabilities and consequences are fluid. Community 
preparedness (e.g. McGee and Russell, 2003; Molino and Huybrechs, 2004) and 
public understanding of science (e.g. Sturgis and Allum, 2004; Lezaun and Soneryd, 
2007) rise and fall, and may vary widely within and between demographics. The 
effectiveness of attempts to translate forms of scientific knowledge between 
audiences and contexts each depend on multiple local factors, some, such as 
political allegiances and trust in government agencies, being outside the control of 
any one party. Any mitigation intervention that relies significantly on public action 
encounters uncertainties stemming from the given local social, political and 
economic context. As such, translation uncertainties are very important to risk 
mitigation practice and will necessarily be a key element in the RMPP project’s 
engagement with risk mitigation professionals in its three case studies. These 
uncertainties are, nonetheless, not scientific and are therefore outside the scope of 
this report. 
 
This report’s categorisation of uncertainties encountered and managed by bushfire 
and flood risk mitigation professionals will facilitate the methods of this project, 
including ensuring that the research is engaged with industry practice and policy 
priorities, as well as being useful to other people and institutions more broadly: 
 
• First, the categorisation of uncertainties developed will be useful to this 
project	
  and other social science research projects engaging with the complex 
and technical practices of risk mitigation professionals. Framing these 
uncertainties categorically as well as technically will prove useful to 
analysing the management of uncertainty across and between case studies.  
• Second, it is anticipated that risk professionals will express differing 
opinions about the different uncertainties in mitigation practice in terms of 
their relative influence, changeability, volatility, and so on. Increased 
knowledge about the importance of different categories of uncertainties to 
mitigation practice will facilitate management of these uncertainties, for 
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example, in terms of resourcing and design of risk mitigation training, 
communications and education.   
• Third, this categorisation of diverse forms of scientific knowledge and their 
uncertainties supports the capacity of risk mitigation professionals to 
explain risk and justify mitigation practices both to other risk mitigation 
professionals and to the public. Being able to describe a scientific uncertainty 
is a vital aspect of internal and external risk communication and, as such, 
these categories will prove useful in communicating the origins and 
character of an uncertainty. 
• Fourth, this report will be of particular use to non-scientists, including those 
engaged in research and industry roles, in generating an understanding of 
some of the key causes and consequences of scientific uncertainty in 
bushfire and flood risk mitigation. Such an understanding is necessary to 
any investigation of how individuals and agencies use and understand 
diverse scientific evidence and other forms of knowledge in their risk 
mitigation roles. 
 
This report’s review of the literature relating to scientific uncertainty in bushfire 
and flood risk mitigation illustrates that there are a multitude of ‘known unknowns’ 
that must be encountered and managed by practitioners and decision-makers if 
they hope to effectively manage these risks. Social science research methods are 
well positioned to investigate how these uncertainties are understood and managed 
by risk mitigation practitioners across multiple practices, agencies and sites. 	
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TABLE 1: Uncertainty Categories for Scientific Knowledges Used in Bushfire and Flood Risk Mitigation6 
Uncertainty type Key forms Elaboration  
Historicist – uncertainty 
arising out of reliance 
on historical data, due 
to assumed determining 
relationship between 
the past, the present 
and the future 
Gaps and inconsistencies 
in historical datasets on 
relevant environmental 
variables  
Gaps can arise out of: innovations in measuring 
apparatuses; variations in data metrics; variations in the 
geographical spread of measuring apparatuses; 
unreliable measurements; commercially sensitive data 
collections; fragmented storage; and, funding 
constraints.  
Relative rarity, uniqueness 
and force of a given 
hazard event 
 
Lack of historical exemplars is a barrier to prediction. 
Catchment data sets that are based on mean and 
medium river flow have limited insights into flood 
discharges. Measuring apparatuses can be destroyed 
during hazard event. Relative randomness of bushfire 
ignition points, and fire behaviour unique to fire-terrain 
and fire-atmosphere interactions.  
Assumption that natural 
systems fluctuate within 
an envelope of variability 
known as ‘stationarity’ 
Climate change requires recognition of both temporal 
and spatial variability into the future, the parameters of 
which are uncertain.   
Instrumental – 
uncertainty arising out 
of limitations of a given 
apparatus, heuristic or 
theory7  
Difficulty of capturing 
hazard behaviours in 
simulators, largely due to 
uncertainties surrounding 
behavioural algorithms 
 
E.g.: the complexity of feedback mechanisms between 
fire and atmosphere; the assumptions of mass and 
momentum conservation in hydrology and hydraulics, 
though catchment responses to rainfall are necessarily 
non-linear. Difficulties with behavioural algorithms include 
historicist uncertainties, such as data limits. Data synthesis 
strains against computational resources and reporting 
requirements.  
Limits to modelling of at-
risk assets and values 
 
Spatially static entities (e.g. property, infrastructure) can 
be incorporated into topographical modelling; but 
spatially dynamic entities (e.g. human life, flora and 
fauna) are either excluded or rendered through static 
proxies.  
Contested 
methodological standards  
E.g. ‘100-year flood’. Standards do not include all 
available data but remain in use because of resource 
limitations, institutional preferences and literacies. These 
also iteratively influence the framing of scientific methods 
and projects.  
Interventionist – 
predictive calculations 
about the effect of 
mitigation interventions 
Quantifying intervention 
additionality 
 
Mitigation benefits have their own historicist and 
instrumental uncertainties, and are influenced by non-
scientific aspects such as policy priorities, social values, 
and political context. 
Reflexivity, with respect to 
parameters and primary, 
secondary and emergent 
consequences of 
interventions  
 
Uncertain effects of interventions on at-risk values, e.g.:  
‘safe development paradox’ or ‘levee effect’; and, the 
ecological effects of prescribed burning and dams and 
levees. Uncertainty surrounding implementation of 
interventions. These unintended consequences should be 
considered calculable and non-calculable uncertainties. 
 	
    	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
6 Developed for the purposes of the ‘Scientific Diversity, Scientific Uncertainty and Risk Mitigation Policy and 
Planning’ project by Timothy Neale and Jessica K. Weir. 
7 Note that bushfire risk is typically figured on likelihood of conducive conditions not on likelihood of occurrence. 
Flood risk is usually calculated in two ways: the likelihood of occurrence of rain-driven flood events; and, the 
spatial modelling of flood behaviour.  
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